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Abstract 
 
In the UK context of National Security Strategies and Critical National Infrastructure Protection, resil-
ience is understood as a result of, or an answer to, an ever changing, complex and interconnected 
world in which even a tiny event can have a huge impact. Resilience incorporates the need to adapt 
to an almost infinite variety of hazards and risks and could therefore be called an all-hazards ap-
proach in the wider realm of security. However, an analysis of UK security policy documents and 
qualitative in-depth interviews with a variety of stakeholders shows it is more than that. Resilience is 
framed as a means to address change in general. It includes not only the negative aspects of globali-
sation but also its opportunities. Moreover, resilience is understood as a whole-of-government, if not 
whole-of-nation attempt to ‘connect the dots’ and overcome the ‘silo thinking’ in order to see the 
‘bigger picture’. Therefore, resilience, in the UK, is often understood as a form of culture rather than 
a tool, instrument, concept or approach. In order for it to ‘function’, resilience has to overcome and 
reach beyond simple top-down or bottom-up approaches. It has to be lived. 
Keywords: resilience, security, risk, change, critical infrastructure, United Kingdom 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Das vorliegende Arbeitspapier beschäftigt sich mit der Ausgestaltung von Resilienz in Großbritannien, 
speziell in Bezug auf die jeweiligen Nationalen Sicherheitspolitiken sowie den Schutz Kritischer Infra-
strukturen. Dabei wird anhand von Interviews mit staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren sowie 
einer Policy-Analyse relevanter Dokumente sichtbar, dass Resilienz im Falle von GB nicht allein die 
Kurz- sondern ebenso die Langzeitperspektive inkludiert. In diesem Sinne zielt Resilienz nicht allein 
auf die Fähigkeit ab sich von Krisen zu erholen sondern sie wird ganz allgemein als unumgängliche 
Antwort auf eine Welt im Wandel verstanden. Dabei soll es vor allem darum gehen, das große Ganze 
in den Blick zu nehmen und jenseits von Silodenken der voranschreitenden Komplexität gerecht zu 
werden, in dem duale Ansätze von „bottom-up“ und „top-down“ überwunden und in Form einer 
„Resilienzkultur“ gelebt werden. 
Schlüsselwörter: Resilienz, Sicherheit, Risiko, Wandel, Kritische Infrastruktur, Großbritannien 
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Introduction 
 
It is a challenge to define what resilience is and what it means in practice for organiza-
tions and professionals. (Higgins, Business Continuity Institute, 02:20) 
 
There is no absolute agreement about what resilience means, does and should do. It is some-
times understood as a buzzword (Walsh, 2013), a value (Zebrowski, 2016), a tool, or a mode of 
governance (cf. Joseph, 2013). However, although highly context-dependent, it seems to in-
clude several main characteristics, which are commonly shared by academics, security policy 
actors and UK stakeholders alike. The aim of this working paper is to identify the similarities 
and differences between the various actors about what resilience means, what its 
(dis)advantages are and how it unfolds in practice. It tries to trace what the paper identifies as 
the UK specificity of resilience as a ‘culture’, and as an answer to an ever -changing world. 
Thereby it includes questions about short and long term aspects and challenges and opportu-
nities regarding a new understanding of an uncertain future. It does so by analysing UK secur i-
ty policies, namely the National Security Strategies (NSS) as well as its stand on Critical Natio n-
al Infrastructure Protection (CNIP), and drawing on interviews with various (non-)state UK 
stakeholders.1 
 
This paper will at first discuss the historical and current (institutional) resilience approaches 
and implementations in the UK. Second, it will address the question if, and if so, how, resil i-
ence has changed the relevant stakeholder landscape and the distribution of responsibili ties 
between them. Third, the paper will discuss the various modes at work in what UK stakehold-
ers have called ‘resilience culture’. It then elaborates the roles of values and leadership in this 
context. Fourth, the paper will demonstrate that resilience is understood as an answer to 
change in general and thus asks how resilience can or should work in practice. After touching 
upon its (dis)advantages as well as its relationship with security , this paper will conclude by 
giving an outlook for the future of resilience and resilience future(s) with regards to UK na-
tional security policies.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1
 The author conducted five interviews with high level UK resilience stakeholders working for (non-
)governmental as well as private business organisations. They were carried out in London between May and 
June 2016. 
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Now and then – UK resilience in its historic and current dimensions  
 
First mentioned by the National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2008 2, resilience introduced a shift 
from the narrow realm of traditional defence to ‘softer’ elements of security policies (cf. Po-
spisil & Gruber, 2016). While resilience in the international context was closely linked with the 
topics of climate change and (lack of) natural resources,  its introduction on a national level 
focused on disaster control and crisis management (cf. Manyena, 2006). However, this limited 
focus subsequently was broadened.  
 
At current, resilience ranges from the protection of critical national infrastructure to civil 
emergencies, pandemics or terrorist attacks. Contrasting some scholarly accounts which argue 
that resilience signifies the drawback of the state and the externalisation of its responsibilities 
(cf. Joseph, 2013), the state, interestingly, took over more responsibility following the intro-
duction of the new civil contingency policy after the end of the Cold War. The most severe 
change can be identified as a closer engagement of central state departments and the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat in regard to civil emergencies (cf. Pospisil & Gruber, 2016;  Smith, 
2003). At a bureaucratic level, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) is the key governme n-
tal player when it comes to resilience and security policies. It is part of the National Security 
Secretariat and includes various tasks which are described as follows:  
 The National Risk Assessment and National Risk Register (identifying and assessing 
risks to national safety and security arising from terrorism, major industrial accidents 
and natural hazards, over 5 years) 
 The National Security Risk Assessment (identifying global risks to UK security interests, 
in a 5 to 20 year timeframe) 
 Leading a cross-government resilience capabilities programme to improve public sector 
response to such emergencies 
 Contingency planning and capability building for the risks of catastrophic emergencies 
                                                             
2
 ‘Traditionally, the Government has been expected to deal with the threats and risks to national security 
through the Armed Forces, the police, border staff, and the intelligence and security agencies. Increasingly, the 
changing nature of the threats and risks, and our improved understanding of the best way to respond to them, 
demand broader partnerships. We will build on the coalition of public, private and third sectors already in-
volved in counter-terrorism. We will work with owners or operators to protect critical sites and essential ser-
vices; with business to improve resilience; with local authorities and communities to plan for emergencies and 
to counter violent extremism; and with individuals, where changing people’s behaviour is the best way to miti-
gate risk’ (HM Government, 2008, p. 8). 
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 Policy for secure and resilient national infrastructure, and corporate resilience in the 
private sector (Centre for Science and Policy, University of Cambridge, 2016) 3 
Furthermore, the secretariat is meant to support the Prime Minister as well as the cabinet 
especially in relation to questions about civil emergency planning and response.  
In contrast to the common assumption about resilience as a rather short-term ability to 
‘bounce back’ from a crisis, the respondents stressed the importance of including short as well 
as long term perspectives. What resilience actually encompasses when looking at the ‘bigger 
picture’ is illustrated by the graph shown below, which was depicted by one of the interview-
ees (Interview 2): 
 
 Resilience 
Timescale Acute Chronic 
Nature of disturbance Shock Stress 
Respond to disturbance Continuity Adaptability 
 
However, one critical aspect is the question of how to differentiate between short and long -
term aspects. As Emily Hough from Crisis Response Journal (CRJ) claims, ‘[i]t is like being in the 
eye of a storm. You don't know when the worst of it is over. You think this is a shock now, but 
it might just be the edges of a storm and it's going to be a hell of a lot worse – but how to de-
fine long-term within that context?’ (Hough, CRJ, 34:48). The illustration highlights one aspect 
about resilience that the main stakeholders in the UK context identified as key: its proactive 
element. This particularly involves the inclusion of impact as well as cause and can be de-
scribed as follows: 
 
So you are really sort of thinking about risk mitigation not just as impact mitigation, 
you are thinking about it in terms of cause mitigation as well. And that is thinking which 
is very, very much, characteristic of resilience. Because you are not just looking at the 
response element. You are looking at the cause or the long term, the context and so on. 
(Interview 2, 18:54)  
 
                                                             
3
 CSaP, see http://www.csap.cam.ac.uk/organisations/civil-contingencies-secretariat/ 
 
Keep Calm and Carry on?  AP 91 
Resilience and UK security policies   
Sarah Ponesch 
  
6 
As described by one interviewee, this shift in the application of resilience resulted from the 
2010 National Security Strategy. Back then the strategy was still based on what can be called 
an ‘all-risks approach’ where the consequences of certain risks were understood as common , 
but there still were separate planning processes going on. This changed with the state minister 
of security at that time, Lady Neville-Jones, who addressed this former practice as a waste of 
(human) resources. Instead of treating the identified risks and their respective state depar t-
ments and actors as separate issues, she argued for a joined up effort towards the respective 
matters: 
 
You counter-terrorism people, you civil emergencies people, you are going to work out a 
single framework whereby we will understand the common consequences of things. And 
we will prepare the capabilities, plans etc. to deal with them. … But where we need to 
think separately about terrorist threats, or accidents, or errors or other forms of risk 
then we will do so. So there is this phrase of this coming together of all risks to have 
certainly more efficient and I think more effective approach to thinking about resilience. 
(Interview 2, 41:04) 
 
These developments point towards a shift in the general assumptions about the future. While 
the threats to a state like the UK were formerly understood as calculable, this perception 
changed after the end of the Cold War and especially since 9/11  (cf. Aradau & Munster, 2011) 
and, especially in the case of the UK, 7/74. Resilience strongly resonates with the fact that se-
curity no longer can be guaranteed due to the permanent (latent) presence of known or un-
known risks (Corry, 2012; Pospisil & Gruber, 2016). Instead of solely relying on the knowledge 
of risk assessments, this new perspective rests upon and reproduces the assumption that ‘[w]e 
[the UK] are entering an age of uncertainty’ (HM Government, 2010, p. 3). Although this one is 
taken from the old NSS from 2010, it resonates with recent statements, along which ‘the world 
is more dangerous and uncertain today than five years ago’ (HM Government, 2015, p. 3). 
Here, unpredictability and uncertainty are even more pronounced than in the NSS 2010. Espe-
cially in light of these changes, UK security policy designs resilience to be an adequate answer 
to the supposed increase in the potentiality of danger and uncertainty but, as we will see, also 
as an enabler of new opportunities. 
 
 
                                                             
4
 The term 7/7 refers to a series of suicide bombings targeting the London transport system on 7
 
July 2005. 
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Resilience culture, leadership and values in the UK 
 
While the rise of resilience in the context of national security policies chimes with an interna-
tional trend since the 2000’s in states like the US, Israel, Singapore or Australia, it has very 
specific national connotations. One factor that the interviewees identify as key is the element 
of leadership, or more specifically ‘visionary leadership’ (Hough, CRJ, 44:36; highlighted by 
author), as a central aspect for the success of resilience. Moreover, the interviews unanimous-
ly connect such leadership characteristics with the embracement of specific values, thus fos-
tering a certain UK self-image or national identity (cf. Interview 2; Caddick, Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers (PwC); Hough, CRJ). As Martin Caddick from PwC highlights, ‘if I wanted to create a 
resilient organisation … it starts from the top. … You need to understand what you’re about 
and you need to communicate that clearly. I think the same is true nationally as well. This is 
what we stand for, these are the things that matter to us’ (Caddick, PwC, 53:04). Caddick goes 
further and claims that 
 
the key to understanding resilience is understanding what's important to you: to you as 
a business, to society, to the government. Understanding the things that you depend 
on, and the factors that make those dependencies more or less resilient. And managing 
that. You don't know what's going to happen, but you can make yourself better able to 
respond and more likely to survive. (Caddick, PwC, 32:20)  
 
In this sense, resilience becomes a mechanism to deal with uncertainties while nevertheless 
following certain goals that may change over time but are still guided by very specific visions 
and values, be they for an organisation or a society. Resilience, hence, does  not necessarily 
mean to simply ‘going with the grain’,  but instead to identify and to realise necessary 
achievements in spite of increasing interdependency and change across the globe. In accor d-
ance, the NSS (2010) describes the UK’s ‘place in the world’ like this: 
 
Our strategy reflects the country that we want to be: a prosperous, secure, modern and 
outward-looking nation, confident in its values and ideas. Our national interest com-
prises our security, prosperity and freedom. We must be a nation that is able to bring 
together all the instruments of national power to build a secure and resilient UK and to 
help shape a stable world. Our outlook will be characterised by flexibility and resilience 
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and underpinned by a firm commitment to human rights, justice and the rule of law. 
(HM Government, 2010, p. 10) 
 
Although this strategy is six years old, it still holds true for the current self-proclamation of the UK. 
The aspects of its openness as well as its central role in the world market and its global influence in 
promoting its values are considered as the main building blocks of the nation (see HM Gover n-
ment, 2105). Against this background, I argue that security policies in general and NSS’s in 
particular are part of an intended, policy-led nation-building process. Thus, they simultaneous-
ly signify a nation claim while at the same time producing the very object they rely on – the 
nation. 
 
The openness of the UK is continuously mentioned as a great opportunity concerning the free 
market, but at the same time framed as leaving the nation vulnerable to a whole variety of 
threats and risks, ‘natural’ as well as ‘human made’ (HM Government, 2010; HM Government, 
2015). The known and unknown risks resulting from the interconnectedness of the UK, the 
networks of institutions, people, technologies and things, are especially relevant when it 
comes to the protection of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) as ‘the networked world cr e-
ates great opportunities but also new vulnerabilities. In particular, protecting virtual assets 
and networks, on which our economy and way of life now depend, becomes as important as 
directly protecting physical assets and lives’ (HM Government, 2010). Resilience, then, can be 
understood as ‘an intelligent program to keep yourself [and your CNI; author’s note] healthy… 
And healthy appropriate to your lifestyle. You know, to the things that you want to do’ (Cad-
dick, PwC, 33:13). 
 
Since more than 80 percent of the UK CNI is run or owned by private companies, the coopera-
tion between state and private businesses is crucial when it comes to their functioning. There-
fore, Public-Private-Partnerships are perceived as unavoidable. This leads to the question of 
the distribution of responsibilities (HM Government, 2015, p. 44). Based on the Civil Conti n-
gencies Act of 2004, a regulatory framework legally obliges CNI companies to meet certain 
standards.5 Yet, as the interviews showed, the act is no longer understood as sufficient to 
meet the necessary requirements to enhance resilience on a broader level. Instead , the inter-
                                                             
5
 ‘Resilience, generally as a concept, is something that we are working on at an international standards level’ 
(Hall, London First, 02:25). 
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views emphasise the fact that Civil Contingencies Act, being more than ten years old, needs to 
be updated in order to address the present needs. As stressed by one interviewee, one major 
shortcoming in this regard is the neglect of 80 percent of the businesses, since the act solely 
aims at the inclusion of local authorities and key providers (Hall, London First, 08:05). In addi-
tion, although it is used as a major source for the implementation of resilience, the Continge n-
cy Act never actually mentions the word resilience (see Civil Contingencies Act, 2004).  
 
The question of how the government can ensure the basic requirements of CNIP is another 
aspect that needs to be taken into account. (cf. Hall, London First). Implementing legally bind-
ing instruments is thereby an ambiguous task: while they are perceived as important in order 
to get private businesses to implement certain standards to ensure the resilience of CNI (Hall, 
London First), they themselves may result in repercussions on smaller businesses (Hough, CRJ). 
Such instruments could thus reinforce the concentration of financial powers in the hand of 
only a few big companies. Hence, the trick is to get companies to invest in resilience, as ‘som e-
thing that they are not really interested in doing’ (Hall, London First, 10:32), while at the same 
time keeping the balance between big players and SMEs. This is no easy task since, according 
to Emily Hough, regulations are  
 
absolutely well thought out, there to protect everywhere down the chain, but by doing 
so you can make it impossible for smaller organisations to take part because the barri-
ers are prohibitive. It can demand resources that SMEs simply don’t have. They don't 
have big administrative departments or HR departments and that's an overlooked e f-
fect that just concentrates the financial power in bigger groups.  (Hough, CRJ, 41:06) 
 
When asked about the tensions between short-term profits of privately run CNI and the long-
term goal of their continuous functioning for society’s basic needs, the interviewees unan i-
mously agreed that some businesses – including those in charge of CNI – are mainly interested 
in short-term profits, which inherently contradicts resilience. ‘Money saving and efficiency is 
the enemy of resilience. You know, resilience likes redundancy, resilience likes buffer stock’ 
(Caddick, PwC, 44:32). Thus, resilience ‘can’t be done just on a cost basis. It is more than just 
cost, you need to factor resilience in’ (ibid., 46:07). It is precisely these kinds of tensions that 
create a ‘conflict between the private sector and the public good’ (Hough, CRJ, 36:42). It may 
be argued that these new forms of PPP’s are able to foster or to enable a stronger implemen-
tation of resilience. Yet, it cannot be overlooked that 
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a lot of it [CNI] is in the hands of private sector, yet the ramifications if something were 
to happen, are very, very public, and not least to mention who would pick up the bill 
and so forth. And these are just the areas that we have anticipated. But  the last ten 
years have shown that we cannot possibly predict the type of crisis and emergency that 
we will face in the future. We have got an idea, but we don't know how that will mani-
fest itself and in what form. (ibid., 06:08) 
 
As an answer to the difficulties in the distributions of responsibility, respondents (cf. Hall, 
London First; Higgins, BCI) highlight the importance of (inter-)national standards that are cur-
rently in the making (ISO22316) or have already been published in 2014 (BS65000). This relates 
to another question necessary to be addressed, the question of uncertainty and risk (manage-
ment).  
 
 
Resilience as the culture of change?  
 
It’s not just about reacting to threats in the marketplace, it’s about reacting to  changes 
in the marketplace. (Caddick, PwC, 21:07) 
 
As the two exemplary extracts from the NSS of 2010 and 2015 have shown, the idea of resili-
ence reflects the idea of an uncertain future. This future is regarded as being full of increasing-
ly diverse risk perceptions, which are drawn by National and Local Risk Registers alike. The 
identified risks are thereby ranked along the lines of likelihood and impact, thus crea ting a 
system of guidance for their prioritisation in the (National) Security Strategies (see HM Gov-
ernment, 2015). Nevertheless, this risk assessment approach is no longer sufficient in light of 
the radical changes in a world that is widely regarded as being more and more unpredictable 
(cf. Pospisil, 2013):  
 
The world is changing rapidly and fundamentally. We are seeing long-term shifts in the 
balance of global economic and military power, increasing competition between states, 
and the emergence of more powerful non-state actors. We are increasingly likely to 
have to deal with unexpected developments. (HM Government, 2015, p. 15) 
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Or as one of the interviewees states, ‘probability is a useless measure.  In risk matrices based 
on probability and impact, it is increasingly hard to gauge probability in unpredictable and 
complex systems. But it's not just probability – because when you look at potential impact, it's 
becoming equally hard to predict the impact of a risk ’ (Caddick, PwC, 30:51). Caddick challeng-
es conventional risk management approaches, and claims that there is ‘a lot of chance in im-
pact. So you can’t really predict the impact. So what use is risk management?’ (ibid., 31:28). 
Further, resilience not only includes the possibility to deal with these kinds of uncertainties, 
but takes on this ability as one of its main characteristics. In this sense, resilience fosters the 
proactive engagement with the kinds of changes that can neither be predicted nor prevented. 
 
When asked about whether resilience applies in the same way for counter-terrorism as it does, 
for example, for disaster management or cyber security Deborah Higgins from the Business 
Continuity Institute (BCI) says that  
 
it is everything. It is not just about hazards though. Not just things that go wrong. It is 
change generally. Rather than all hazards, the new international standard for organisa-
tional resilience [and resilience in general; author’s note] is talking about adapting to 
change. Change could be a hazard, fire, flood, cyber, terror, as much as it could be an 
aggressive hostile take-over in your market place, and damage to your business from a 
competitor. What makes organisations resilient is being able to, having the capability  
to adapt to that. (Higgins, BCI, 31:57) 
 
What this general capacity or inherent quality of resilience means in relation to change, not-
withstanding negative or positive, will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Means to an end or means in itself? 
 
In contrast to the common understanding of resilience being bound to change, there is disa-
greement about the question of what resilience actually is. Although strongly related to the 
previous discussion about resilience culture, leadership and values, it seems to be unclear 
whether it is a goal in itself or a tool, an instrument or approach to achieve something else, 
e.g. a strategy. Resilience, then correlating with the call for a strong national identity, is re-
garded as a possibility to deal with the ongoing dynamics of an ever changing world in order to 
achieve a certain goal which is not resilience itself. Instead, it is perceived as ‘a means to an 
end not a means in itself’ (Interview 2) , which then can be understood as an instrument to 
arrive at a very specific aim. However, this position was opposed by other interviewees who 
claimed that resilience itself should be the goal to aim for: 
 
Resilience can be thought of as a goal to aspire to, a desired state, it provides a strat e-
gic rationale for many of the protective functions. The word resilience is creeping into 
an organization’s policies and plans, but there is no exact science or guidance of how to 
do it. (Higgins, BCI, 45:35)  
 
Contrasting this understanding, one perspective offered during the interviews was that ‘resil i-
ence applies or it doesn't apply but it is not a finite journey. Because you are always going to 
be working towards it, and you think of change, and you are going to be more and more pro-
gressive. So it's not a destination, it's a journey’ (Hall, London First, 17:02). As already dis-
cussed, resilience gets exposed to its own vagueness at this point.  
 
These tensions within the notion itself are exemplified by the following positions: one inter-
viewee claims that ‘resilience is a fundamental aspiration that we should be working towards. 
It is absolutely vital in every sense. That’s personal resilience, that's professio nal resilience, 
that's critical infrastructure resilience, disaster resilience – all these things. But how to bring 
them all together?’ (Hough, CRJ, 07:32). What seems to oppose this statement is the sugges-
tion of another interviewee to always ask why exactly a person values resilience. While it 
seems to be the case that resilience has almost become self-evident – which is often described 
as one of the main challenges regarding the question of what it can and should do – the inter-
viewee states that it is exactly the engagement with this supposed self-explanation that can 
lead people towards identifying their goals. ‘Resilience has no inherent, in nature, intrinsic 
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value. It has value because it enables you to do something else, or be something else, or 
achieve something else. So in that sense I would always regard resilience as an enabler’ (high-
lighted by author; Interview 2, 24:32). 
 
What links the varying positions of the interviewees is the idea that resilience should not mean 
to adapt to just anything, but instead it should serve as an enabler to achieve something spe-
cific, like an organisational, personal or national  strategy. What is considered important in this 
regard is being clear about your values as well as your goals, or in other words, ‘resilie nce is 
being true to where you come from but achieving where you want to go’ (Interview 2, 29:17). 
This idea is further exemplified by the following citation from the NSS 2010:  
 
Any strategy for our national security must begin with the role we want Britai n to play 
in the modern world. In a world that is changing at an astonishing pace, Britain’s inte r-
ests remain surprisingly constant. We are an open, outward-facing nation that depends 
on trade and has people living all over the world. (HM Government, 2010, p. 4) 
 
Therefore, resilience could be understood as a necessary answer to an ever changing world by 
including capacities such as adaptability, flexibility, coping, redundancy or absorbance. Coming 
back to the question of leadership and values, it seems that resilience could serve as a means 
to protect the relatively stable national interests, not in spite of but through or because of 
these obviously fluid qualities.   
 
 
Resilience at work – Connecting the dots, permeating the silos 
 
Another consensus about resilience is its capacity of ‘seeing the bigger picture’, having the 
‘birds eye view’, ‘connecting the dots’ or in other words ‘not to develop something new. It is a 
different way of looking at what you already do’ (Higgins, BCI, 44 :47). Resilience not only aims 
at a multi-actor as well as multi-level approach, but demands it in order to work. Or, in other 
words, 
 
the fundamental metaphor I always reach for when talking to people about resilience is 
joining the dots. And that kind of implies it is multi-actor. You got people who do this, 
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you got people who do this, you have got people who do both. But you’ve got to get 
them all working together. (Interview 2, 37:35) 
 
Looking at the multi-actor element, resilience is commonly described as enhancing coopera-
tion between the already established stakeholders, while also including new ones. The idea 
that resilience necessitates the cooperation of various levels and actors of state, business o r-
ganisation and society is thus widely accepted. Or, as the NSS (2015) states, ‘[t]he UK’s resil i-
ence depends on all of us – the emergency services, local and central government, businesses, 
communities and individual members of the public’ (HM Government, 2015, p. 43). This was 
already described in the NSS of 2010, which states that 
 
we need to build a much closer relationship between government, the private sector 
and the public when it comes to national security. Of course, the Government has a cr u-
cial role to play, and we will certainly fulfi l our responsibilities. But we all have a part to 
play in keeping the country safe – be it from terrorists, cyber-attack or natural disas-
ters. (HM Government, 2010, p. 5) 
 
The main question, then, remains how to achieve an improved cooperation between the var i-
ous stakeholders? How can and shall resilience actually work? The NSS 2015 stresses that the 
government promotes and practices ‘local cross-border coordination between responders, 
where required’ (HM Government, 2015, p. 44). In cases of extraordinary emergencies, espe-
cially the ones that impact the UK as a whole, they link the UK government’s emergency coor-
dination structures with the ones of the devolved administrations in order to guarantee a co-
ordinated response.  
 
This is regarded as particularly relevant in events that affect the CNI (ibid.). One interviewee 
points out that the civic engagement in the coalition of stakeholders fostering resilience does 
not have to be newly invented all together, but could rest upon older institutional measures 
which were installed during the Cold War. The respondent claims that ‘we need some sort of 
organised structure like that [civil defence during the Cold War; author’s note] to assemble the 
volunteers. Because I think that the threats today, and it's not just terrorism, are so great that 
we can't just cobble it together when something happens’ (Hall, London First, 05:56). This sug-
gestion resonates with other recent recommendations in Germany (FAZ, 21-08-2016) or Swe-
den (see Gruber, 2016), which advocate for the revival of older civil defence instruments.  
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Still, this does not fully address the question from above, which not only relates to the organi-
sational aspect of the coordination of emergencies but also to resilience in general, including 
its ‘vision’. There is no straightforward answer, but, according to Deborah Higgins from the 
BCI, it certainly includes ‘further collaboration between business functions and fostering a 
culture of resilience aligned to the values and beliefs of the organisation’ (Higgins BCI, 46:53). 
Again, this citation resonates with the section about values discussed above while connecting 
it to the question of how resilience works in practice. 
 
According to the interviews, resilience can only work top-down as well as bottom-up. More 
specifically, one could argue that it has to precisely overcome these dualisms and be applied to 
policy culture, or even culture in a much broader sense, in order to work. Three major topics 
raised in this regard are awareness, knowledge and cooperation. Identified as the main build-
ing blocks, they help enhance resilience through the multifaceted layers of the state, private 
businesses and society. As mentioned by one interviewee, it is essential not to rely on ‘accept-
ed wisdom’ (Hough, CRJ) without questioning it and asking ‘how much have they actually lis-
tened?’ (ibid., 23:41). Further,  
 
in large organisations you have to have roles and structures, and I understand that. But 
when you are sitting through the 100th most boring meeting that you have sat through 
in the last year, it is easy to switch off and reduce the issues to safe words, accepted 
terminologies and long-established policies and plans. You need to actually bring the is-
sues to life again, to show the possible ramifications of an incident, without being hys-
terical about it. One possible solution could be to bring more creative vision back into 
training, to challenge people’s assumptions and bring them out of their comfort zones . 
(Hough, CRJ, 24:04) 
 
Resilience, hence, seems to include different elements or roles with respect to where one 
stands. While UK resilience is essentially based on leadership, which, as already mentioned, 
comes down to identifying and following your very own strategy, resilience also has be rooted 
and lived through a culture that goes through various ‘degrees and levels’ (Higgins, BCI, 
00:36:36). One of the many difficulties here is to overcome the habit that ‘everyone falls back 
on what they know’ (Hough, CRJ, 24:32). A telling comment by one of the interviewees claims 
that  
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you have got to allow people to be able to think, so they have resilience firmly under-
pinning all their actions. And everyone in whatever sector or department has to under-
stand that resilience should be a fundamental tenet of that. Everything they do, both as 
standard good practice for the success of an organisation, and to withstand any exter-
nal shocks. They must be able to think about it and have the autonomy and the permis-
sion to act as they see fit. And they must be allowed, indeed encouraged, to think crea-
tively without fear of reprisal, being pilloried in the media or being ‘punished’ in some 
other way.  (Hough, CRJ, 11:16) 
 
However, what happens if the leadership vision of resilience clashes with the interests of 
communities or individuals? In order to summarise this tension, one of the main challenges 
remains that ‘[r]esilience governance in the realm of nation-state based security policy neces-
sarily has to face the paradox of inducing a societal process in a top-down, or “macro-
structural” manner’ (Pospisil & Gruber, 2016, p. 4; cf. Wilson, 2014). Hence, if the two starting 
points from ‘above’ and ‘below’ do not work together, or maybe even if they are not over-
come, resilience cannot work. In this sense ‘[t]he challenge is how. Because everyone is al-
ready doing what they regard their responsibilities and their activities. So to me it is the coo r-
dination of it all – whose role and whose job is it to coordinate all of this together. At a gov-
ernmental level that is the challenge’ (Higgins, BCI, 48:59). In other words, 
 
[you have] all these lovely departments in silos and there is nobody in government co n-
trolling it, you know linking it together, in a concerted way. And that's the weakest part 
I think in the governance of resilience. Until you have someone in charge, either a min-
ister of civil affairs or a minister of resilience, someone who can join the dots, I don't 
think you have true governance. (Hall, London First, 05:13)   
 
Resilience, as the interviews show, aims at permeating the boundaries between the different 
‘silos’, be it governmental departments, responsibilities or activities. As one interviewee 
stresses, ‘people still are not recognising the interdependencies and the mesh that has to be 
created between public sector, private sector, all the disciplines, cit izens themselves… be-
tween security NGOs who have got to learn to talk to the military, the military, which has to 
engage with NGOs’ (Hough, CRJ, 05:11). Pointing out a critical aspect, the respondent elabo-
rates that ‘they do it at the moment but with great suspicion, because there are implications 
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for their own personal security and safety and of those they are trying to assist’ (ibid., 05:22). 
Yet, it is important to stress that this does not mean ‘merg[ing] all the silos together [into] […] 
one massive super department’ (Hall, London First, 18:31). Instead, ‘they just have to break 
down the barriers, make them more permeable, so that joining the dots, as we say, can be 
easier’ (ibid.).   
 
The silo metaphor is stressed widely among respondents:  ‘[g]overnment is better than it used 
to be but remains in the idea of silos and activities. Government will always be siloed. And our 
job is to make them porous and lower. But sometimes they go quite high’ (Interview 2, 51:51). 
While these measures to improve cooperation between the different departments as well as 
between state, private industry and civil society are highlighted as being necessary in order to 
foster resilience, and therefore inherently positive, there seems to be another, precarious side 
to resilience – both of which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
 
Resilience and its (dis)advantages 
 
Resilience to one person or organisation may mean something different to another. I 
have never met anybody who said they don't want to be resilient. That’s not something 
anybody would say, because you like to be resilient and bounce back from misery, from 
ill health, from any kind of disaster. It is often heard after the terror attacks, about how 
resilient people were, the city was, the communities have been. These are all positive 
uses of the word, but they mean different things in different contexts. Some people say 
the word is overused and ill-defined. (Higgins, BCI, 40:32) 
 
Some of the obvious challenges resilience poses have already been discussed or touched upon 
in the previous chapters: First, what is resilience even – just another buzzword or a whole new 
way of seeing the world? Second, how can resilience actually work? And third, how is it possi-
ble to foster the ‘resilience culture’ without (m)any ‘actual events’ like emergencies, accidents, 
attacks or disasters that prove its necessity? 
 
When it comes to the ‘essence’ of resilience, people have very different ideas about what it 
means – a fact that got very clear throughout the process of discussing with a variety of stake-
holders. The ongoing lively academic debates about what resilience means, does and should 
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do, underline this. Further, ‘resilience is bigger than [for example] emergency management 
and cyber security. It is a little bit too big some people would say’ (Higgins, BCI, 20:42). One 
could even argue that ‘it appears that everything (organizations, cities, nations) and everybody 
(from schoolteachers to the U.S. president) can and should be resilient’  (Comfort, Boin, & 
Demchak, 2010, p. 1). Who or what, actually, can be resilient? One exemplary answer arising 
from the interviews is that ‘systems have to be resilient, networks have to be resilient, organ i-
sations have to be resilient and people have to be resilient’ (Hall, London First, 17:02). Sure 
enough, this encompasses a wide range of potential targets for resilience policies, ye t it fails to 
address the key question of how these various actors can work together in ‘creating’ resil i-
ence, and what happens if, for instance, the resilience of one contradicts the resilience of a n-
other.  
 
Although there is consensus about the fact that resilience has yet to be implemented to a 
greater extent, the question of the current ‘degree’ of implementation is perceived differently. 
While some interviewees claim that a great deal has already been achieved, others state that 
resilience is far away from having sunk into the different layers of the state, private businesses 
and civil society. As one interview partner puts it, ‘I haven't seen resilience plans or policies in 
place. Because I’m not sure we are there yet, I think we are quite early on in having policies 
and plans in place that relate to resilience’ (Higgins, BCI, 45:35). Another interviewee points 
out that ‘it's as vital as bottom line, it's as vital as money, it's as vital as  the air that we 
breathe, in order to fulfil organisational and personal goals and to thrive. But I don't think we 
are at a stage where we are close to that in any way’ (Hough, CRJ, 07:51). Relating to the de-
bate about how to live the ‘resilience culture’, Deborah Higgins, BCI, makes the following 
statement:  
 
What makes an organisation resilient? Often it is that intangible softer factors that are 
very hard to practice and measure, they are reason that an organisation survived som e-
thing, because they had that type of culture. So the challenge for us as practitioners is: 
How do we bring all that together? This is the debate we are having at the moment, na-
tionally and internationally: How do we measure it? How do we know how resilient we 
are now? How do we know if we have improved?  (Higgins, BCI, 07:32) 
 
Regarding fostering a resilience culture, Higgins acknowledges the challenge that ‘if it hasn't 
happened to you, it is putting money into something that might never happen. It is always 
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difficult’ (Higgins, BCI 16:25). This aspect was highlighted by a fair number of interviewees and 
strongly relates to the issues discussed above, namely a certain resilience culture which should 
be promoted and lived across various degrees and levels of state and society. Thus, ‘you can't 
be resilient in bits, you can either be resilient or you can't’ (Interview 2, 15:32). If ‘the whole 
organisation is not on board with what you are there what you are trying to achieve and that 
whole culture is missing, there is always going to be gaps and disasters’ (Higgins, BCI, 25:41). 
In more general terms, resilience ‘is about a changed environment, where horizon scanning 
and situational awareness comes in which is important for resilience. If you are not aware, you 
can't take the opportunities and advantages. You can't survive and thrive if you don't adapt or 
take opportunities if you could have’ ( ibid., 35:14). 
 
These remarks point towards an issue that is key when it comes to the (dis)advantages of resi l-
ience: the future. As already discussed in the previous sections, resilience goes hand in hand 
with the idea that the future is inherently uncertain and full of risks, but also full of opportuni-
ties that often cannot be known in advance. In this sense, 
 
resilience is giving people and institutions and organisations the ability to react in a dif-
ferent way to the unforeseen, and to turn what could be a negative or a disaster into a 
positive.  And that does not mean to get rid of all the old accepted ways of prepared-
ness, training, command, leadership at this stage. But we must accept that sometimes 
things are going to go wrong or that events will unfurl in completely unanticipated 
ways – I am thinking of the 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami in particular. 
(Hough, CRJ, 14:23) 
 
Thus, along with the perception of threat and risk, the question of the relationship between 
security, defence and resilience comes back into the foreground (cf. Pospisil, 2013).  
 
 
Security, defence and resilience – an uneasy relationship? 
 
[E]nsuring a secure and resilient UK – protecting our people, economy, infrastructure, terr i-
tory and way of life from all major risks that can affect us directly – requiring both direct 
protection against real and present threats such as terrorism and cyber-attack, resilience in 
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the face of natural and man-made emergencies and crime, and deterrence against less like-
ly threats such as a military attack by another state (HM Government, 2010, p. 22)  
 
How does resilience relate to security and defence? This is yet another question without a 
straightforward answer. While some scholars argue that resilience replaces security (Evans & 
Reid, 2014), others stress that resilience is a kind of enhanced security (cf. Coaffee & Wood, 
2006; Fjäder, 2004) and still others argue that it couples up with security, such as leading to 
what Pospisil & Gruber (2016) have called a resilience-security-nexus. Whether resilience does 
replace security or goes hand in hand with it, the question of its relationship has not yet been 
sufficiently discussed. 
 
Except for a different interpretation of resilience as a reincarnation of older civil defence 
measures (cf. Duffield, 2011; Zebrowski, 2013), it is widely regarded at current that resilience 
followed and thus opened up the narrow realm of defence at the end of the Cold War era (cf. 
Pospisil & Gruber, 2016). The interviewees adhere to a position that may be illustrated by the 
statement that ‘if national security is the framework then  I think security nests neatly within 
resilience’ (Interview 2, 23:42). However, one interviewee modifies this claim by stating that 
‘in practice resilience is being maybe put under security. In fact, security is a subset of resili-
ence not the other way around. […] And what’s more is that defence is a subset of resilience’ 
(highlighted by author; Caddick, PwC, 17:45). What seems to be commonly accepted, though, 
is the assumption that there is no absolute security and that resilience is a way of dealing with  
that fact, as exemplified by the following statement: 
 
Because you could have the best security in the world. That’s the discussion: there is 
world-class security in place in many cases but there are examples where it is breached. 
Why is it breached? It can't always be a failing of intelligence. And it isn't always be-
cause we did not respond correctly. You’re never going to have absolute security or r e-
silience. It is the degree and the level of protection that you can provide and the reduc-
tion of the impact on the community and on your business. We should be all trying to 
achieve the highest level of resilience that we can. But completely is not possible. I 
don't believe anyone who says that. (Higgins, BCI, 25:22) 
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Conclusion – resilient futures or the future of resilience 
 
Who is best qualified to define the values that are backed up by and lived through a resilience 
culture? How is it possible to promote this idea through leadership and a deep implementation 
throughout the various levels of society and state? What happens if, and that is and will be the 
case eventually, interests between the various stakeholders differ or even contradict each 
other? How can resilience be practised in the everyday without falling into the traps of simply 
repeating ‘common knowledge’ or ‘accepted wisdom’ and doing what has always been done? 
How to best address the problematic tensions between the public good and the privately run 
or owned CNI? While this working paper did not attempt to answer all of these questions, it at 
least tried to hint at some possible directions. 
 
As we have seen, resilience in the UK context is strongly linked to change and the ability to see 
the ‘bigger picture’. It is therefore understood as an inherently holistic way of understanding 
the world. By challenging the ‘old silo thinking’ , it focuses on the interconnectedness of peo-
ple, things and technologies as complex networks of support but also dependency , which 
brings questions of risk and vulnerability into play. Furthermore, it seems that resilience is 
understood as an almost inevitable answer to the ever changing nature of our globalised 
world. In this sense, it aims at dissolving the tensions between short and long term aspects, 
top-down and bottom-up elements, and challenges and opportunities. However, while it 
seems to promote inclusion as well as awareness raising, participatory knowledge and coope r-
ation across boundaries between state and non-state actors, it seems that its ambitious tasks 
in defining the ‘resilience culture’ have not yet been fully internalised through the multifacet-
ed layers of the state, private businesses and society.  
 
To summarise, the questions above seem to be theoretical only at first sight since they have 
immediate practical implications. How will future UK security and resilience policies, including 
the National Security Strategy and CNIP, look like in light of the BREXIT referendum and its 
consequences? And finally, connected to this question is a broader one, namely how do we 
differentiate between the times when we want to be resilient and the times when we want to 
resist? 
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